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Innovation in Workforce Incentives 
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• Incentives tied to Cost, Schedule, Performance Achievement 
• Discussion of Proposed Approach 
• Conclusions   
 
Acquisition System Performance  
• Defense Acquisition Reform 1969-2009 An Elusive Goal, Ronald 
Fox 2011 – 12 programs from 1950s 
• Development costs significantly higher 
• Production costs tend to exceed original estimates by a 
significant margin 
• Schedule delays averaged 36% beyond projected time for 
completion 
• Performance of the Defense Acquisition System 2014, Annual 
Report released by USD – ATL 
• 1992-2014 sixteen programs had 200% development cost 
growth  
• 18 programs had 100% cost growth in early production cost 
• Operational Effectiveness between 80-90% for all programs 
• Operational Suitability 123 programs below 65%, 65 
programs at 80%  
 
Workforce Recommendations   
• Business Executives for National Security (BENS) Taskforce on 
Defense Acquisition Law and Oversight 2009 
• Streamline hiring and rewarding of key acquisition personnel 
including providing appropriate compensation and other 
forms of incentives 
• Inability to couple rewards to performance  
• Acquisition is a business function and demands skills and 
talents that are far more common to the business world than 
to government and military operations 
• Defense Acquisition Reform: Where do we go from here? A 
compendium of views from leading experts, 2014 – US Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
• Half of the experts feel that cultural change is required while 
two-thirds believe improving incentives for the acquisition 
workforce is necessary for reform 
 
Workforce Recommendations 
• Report to Congress on DOD 2014 Study of Program Manager 
Training and Experience 
• Secretary of Defense and Service Secretaries should 
implement clearer, more tangible recognition, incentives, and 
enhanced promotion opportunities for outstanding program 
management   
• Cost performance on major acquisition programs should be 
considered as a major weighting factor for this recognition 
• Continued absence of relevant rewards belies government 
statements of dedication to achieving significant cost 
reduction 
• Cost savings achieved in implementing this recommendation 
can far outweigh any implementation costs to the taxpayer   
Workforce Recommendations 
• Defense Acquisition Reform, 1969-2009 An Elusive Goal, Ronald 
Fox 
• A Personnel Board should provide other incentives such as 
additional pay and incentive compensation 
• An additional $30,000 per year for selected officers and 
civilians could minimize incentives to retire and join the 
defense industry 
• Sweden’s government acquisition agency provides an added 
salary increase for crucial acquisition positions 
• A Swedish colonel and PM can receive a significantly 
higher salary than other colonels or even the director 
general of the agency   
 
Academic Research on Incentives 
• Steven Condly, Richard Clark & Harold Stolovitch in 
The Effects of Incentives on Workplace Performance: 
A Meta-analytic Review of Research Studies 
– Meta-analytic review of 45 studies on the effects of incentives on 
workplace performance 
– Team based incentives provided greater gains 48% improvement in 
performance compared to individual performance gains of 19% 
– Monetary incentives resulted in 27% gain when compared to 13% 
for non-monetary incentives 
– Programs with only top performers receiving incentives versus 
programs where everyone had an opportunity to receive an 
incentive showed no statistical difference but both showed a 22% 
improvement in performance  
 
Academic Research on Incentives 
• Mark Huselid in The Impact of Human Resource 
Management Practices on Turnover, Productivity, and 
Corporate Financial Performances 
– Based on a national survey of 1000 firms comprehensively 
evaluated the links between High Performance Work Practices and 
firm performance 
– Established that high performance work practices have economic 
and statistically significant impact on intermediate employee 
outcomes and short term and long term measures of corporate 
financial performance 
Academic Research on Incentives 
• Alfie Kohn in Harvard Business Review and Daniel Pink in 
“Drive-The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us” argue 
against incentives 
• Gerald Ledford and Barry Gerhart in “Negative Effects of 
Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motivation: More Smoke Than 
Fire” argue rewards increase performance because they 
increase total motivation 
– Social context in which the reward is implemented will enhance rather than 
undermine intrinsic motivation making the incentive effect much more 
powerful than if it relies on extrinsic motivation alone 
Proposed Approach 
• Establish Program Credits (PC) for each program based on Affordability Caps, 
PC available for distribution to acquisition workforce 
• Programs appraised for cost, schedule, performance, affordability, should cost,  
or other relevant criteria at program milestones or annually depending on the 
phase the program is in 
• Program credits have an associated dollar value and vest in employee’s account 
from 4 to 10 years at a variable rate 
– 40-45% vested by the end of Production and Deployment 
– 55-60% vested over the O&S phase 
– No vesting until the start of the Operations and Maintenance phase 
– Rapid acquisition programs may reach vesting in less than 5 years  
• Length of association with program determines contribution and PC benefit 
• Negative credits assessed when program does not meet objectives positive 
credits can be reduced for poor performance during later phases    




Proposed Approach- Critical Factors 
• Career accumulation of  PC can be substantial 
– Motivate workforce to contribute to success of all programs 
– Application to the entire workforce can result in significant positive changes 
• PC must be significant for the workforce to demonstrate “ownership” 
• Allocation of credits must be impartial, fair, and commensurate with an 
individual’s contribution 
– Allocations can vary across employees based on their responsibilities 
– GAO or similar office to administer program 
• All employees associated with a program must be eligible for PC 
• Funds allocated by Congress with legislative changes to make funds 
available for distribution  
Notional Example 
• Program in Technology Maturation & Risk Reduction Phase 
• Affordability Target (LCC) $5000M 
• Program Credits $50M (1% of Affordability Target) 
 
Phase TMRR EMD P&D O&M 
Length of 
Phase 
2 years 3 years 4 years 11 years 
Program 
Credits (%) 
10% 15% 20% 55% 
Program 
Credits  
$5M $7.5M $10M $27.5M 
Eligible 
Workforce 








$16,000 $10,000 $7100 $6100 
Program Credit  Estimation Scheme 
 
Notional Example 
Scenario 1 – An employee stays with the program and the program meets all the objectives 
during all the phases 




Program Credit Vested and Available Upon Retirement or Leaving Government 
 
Notional Example 
• Scenario 1: An employee stays with a program and the program meets all the objectives 
during all the phases 
• Scenario 2: An employee stays with the program and the program meets its objectives 
during the TMRR and EMD phase but does not meet objectives during the O&M phase 
• Vested Credits are available for the employee starting year 7 or the assumed start of the 
O&M phase 
• Starting year 7 the credits from year 1 are vested  after adjusting for reductions due to not 
meeting objectives and available for the employee if he separates 
• The table show the credits available to the individual under the two scenarios  
Available If Employee Retires/Leaves Government Service  
Scenario 1 
Year 7  Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 Year 12 
$16,000   $32,000  $42,000   $52,000   $62,000   $69,100 
 Scenario 2 
Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 Year 12 
$9,900  $19,800  $23,700   $33,700   $43,700 $50,800 
• This is a notional model and the differences and distribution can be optimized 
Required Conditions for the Approach 
 
• Measurement metrics must be established and synchronized with the Acquisition Program 
Baseline which is the PM and team commitment 
• Since O&M costs are difficult to measure at a program level, mission completion or other 
measures used to assess system effectiveness and suitability can be used to measure 
performance during the O&M phase 
• Metrics must be reviewed and must account for threat changes, scope changes, unit cost 
changes due to quantity changes, and Nunn-McCurdy breaches 
• An independent body akin to GAO in conjunction with OMB must be established to assess 
performance against objectives to determine and assign Program Credits 
•  A definition of the acquisition workforce and a fair assessment of the workforce that would 
be eligible for Program Credits must be made 
• An impartial process to allocate program credits to an individual based on the individual’s 
contribution and team achievement must be developed 
• Legislative action to establish funding for program credits and authority to execute a 
program credit scheme will be required 
• An enhanced personnel information system to track program credits from allocation to 
vesting and reductions will need to be implemented   
 
Benefits and Consequences 
• Reduced compensation differential between working for industry and DoD 
• Attract best and brightest from both within and outside government 
• Increased number of military officers in an acquisition career 
– Require regulation and policy changes 
• Compensation differences might lead to morale issues between acquisition and non-
acquisition workforce 
– Food and Drugs Administration has a higher compensation scale for highly qualified scientists 
• Innovation in reducing long term sustainment costs 
• Faster integration of newer technologies into weapon systems 
• Faster time to market with international partners 
• Greater integration of functions - Contracting into the PMO with better negotiations and best 
value  
• The implementation of an incentive system that recognizes the value of the workforce can 
be a significant motivating factor.   
Benefits and Consequences 
• Need for additional monitoring of program 
data to validate accuracy in allocation of 
credits 
• Setting program objectives to maximize 
program credits   
• Development of a complex information 
system to administer and audit the scheme 
– However will result in comprehensive program 
data resulting in opportunities to address systemic 
issues in program execution 
Conclusions and Additional Research 
• Evidence that a well-constructed incentive scheme with human 
resource management practice can improve individual and organization 
performance 
• DOD Acquisition offers additional advantages of being a high purpose 
work environment with opportunities to innovate that can enhance 
intrinsic motivation 
• A notional approach for incentives that are tied to the achievement of 
cost, performance, schedule goals including long term sustainment 
• Additional research in the following areas: 
– Validate factors that would enhance intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
– Measurement of individual contributions in a team setting which is the 
organizational model for DOD programs 
– Necessary conditions to implement a model along with the legislative 
changes   
 
